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(revised) Abstract 
In	  an	  era	  where	  innovations	  in	  society	  and	  institutions	  are	  increasingly	  viewed	  as	  crucial	  to	  address	  
environmental	  issues,	  attempts	  of	  innovation	  in	  concrete	  action	  surprisingly	  received	  little	  attention.	  
Governance	  scholars	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  despite	  precisely	  advocating	  such	  endeavours,	  tend	  to	  focus	  
on	   policy	   designs	   or	   governance	   structures,	   neglecting	   the	   level	   of	   concrete	   action.	   On	   the	   other	  
hand,	   implementation	  scholars,	  although	  precisely	   interested	   in	   the	  policy-­‐action	  relationship,	  gen-­‐
erally	  share	  a	  pessimistic	  tone	  that	  prevented	  them	  to	  address	  these	  phenomena.	  	  
Against	  this	  background,	  the	  present	  contribution	  conceptually	  and	  empirically	  explores	  these	  phe-­‐
nomena	  of	  innovation	  in	  action	  (“innovative	  implementation”).	  To	  do	  so,	  we	  operationalize	  “innova-­‐
tive	  implementation”	  as	  a	  strategy	  by	  which	  (coalitions	  of)	  non-­‐state	  actors	  seek	  to	  develop	  ad	  hoc	  
solutions	  to	  address	  a	  given	  environmental	  issue,	  going	  beyond	  what	  is	  provided	  for	  in	  formal	  policy	  
designs.	  Following	  an	  inductive	  research	  strategy,	  we	  elaborate	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  whose	  main	  
advantage	   is	  to	  bring	  the	  actors	  and	  their	  coalition	   (in	  all	   their	  diversity)	  back	   in	  the	  analysis.	  More	  
concretely,	   we	   state	   that	   perceiving	   implementation	   as	   broader	   ‘social	   interaction	   processes’	   (De	  
Boer	  &	  Bressers	  2011)	  within	  which	  actors	  play	  strategic	  ‘games’	  (Bardach	  1977,	  Scharpf	  1997)	  opens	  
interesting	  lines	  of	  research	  to	  better	  account	  for	  their	  innovative	  and	  strategic	  behaviours.	  In	  a	  se-­‐
cond	   step,	   we	   apply	   this	   framework	   to	   three	   strategies	   of	   innovative	   implementation	   in	   different	  
contexts,	   and	   identify	   on	   this	   basis	   empirical	   regularities	   in	   the	   individual	   pathways	   related	   to	   the	  
emergence	  and	  success	  (or	  failure)	  of	  these	  strategies. 
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Recent	  decades	  witnessed	  a	  growing	  awareness	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  environmental	  problems	  such	  
as	   increased	  pollution	   levels,	  natural	  resources	  depletion,	  disaster	  risks,	  or	  climate	  change	   impacts.	  
(Super-­‐)	  wicked	  in	  nature	  (Levin	  et	  al.	  2012),	  characterized	  by	  a	  high	  level	  of	  uncertainties	  generated	  
by	  scientific	  and	  policy	  unknowns	   (Bressers	  &	  Rosenbaum	  2000),	   these	   issues	  are	  perceived	  as	  un-­‐
commonly	  problematic	  and	  difficult	   to	  tackle	  with	  traditional	   ‘top-­‐down’	  policy	   instruments.	   In	  this	  
context,	  enabling	  innovation	  in	  society	  and	  institutions	  is	  increasingly	  viewed	  as	  a	  crucial	  strategy	  to	  
address	  environmental	  issues	  in	  more	  “creative”	  ways	  (Bressers	  &	  Rosenbaum	  2000:	  525,	  Folke	  et	  al.	  
2005).	  Changes	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  collective	  action	  have	  in	  that	  respect	  been	  called	  for,	  and	  a	  vast	  array	  
of	  concepts	  proposed,	  from	  adaptive	  co-­‐management	  (Olsson	  et	  al.	  2004,	  Pahl-­‐Wostl	  2007)	  to	  envi-­‐
ronmental	  governance	  (Lemos	  &	  Agrawal	  2006),	  network	  governance	  (Carlsson	  &	  Sabdström	  2008)	  
or	  collaborative	  governance	  (Ansell	  and	  Gash	  2008).	  
Pivotal	  to	  these	  approaches	  is	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  “good”	  design	  of	  policies.	  Innovations	  in	  policy	  designs,	  
governance	  structures,	  organizations,	  or	  policy	   instruments	  are,	   inter	  alia,	   some	  of	   the	  drivers	   that	  
have	  steered	  scholars’	   interests	   so	   far.	  While	  existing	  conceptualizations	  are	  based	  on	  differing	  as-­‐
sumptions	   (Termeer	   et	   al.	   2010),	   they	   all	   share	   the	   idea	   that	   state-­‐centred	   approaches	   based	   on	  
“command	   and	   control”	   failed	   to	   address	   properly	   the	   current	   environmental	   issues,	   and	   that	   re-­‐
forms	  of	  both	  the	  types	  of	  policy	   instruments	  and	  the	  form	  of	   interactions	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐
state	   actors	   are	   critical	   in	   importance.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   policy	   instruments	   have	  
been	  identified	  and	  advocated,	  from	  century-­‐long	  practices	  of	  endogenous	  community	  management	  
(Ostrom	  1990)	   to	  more	  modern	   forms	   of	   voluntary	   agreements,	   negotiation-­‐,	   or	  market-­‐based	   in-­‐
struments	  (Jordan	  et	  al.	  2003,	  Bressers	  et	  al.	  2011,	  Pirard	  2012).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  shift	  towards	  
‘network-­‐based	  governance’	  (Duit	  &	  Galaz	  2008)	  –	  with	  a	  broad	  variety	  of	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  
embedded	   in	  networks	  within	  which	  relations	  are	  no	   longer	  seen	  as	  exclusively	  vertical	  and	  hierar-­‐
chical,	  but	  also	  as	  horizontal	  and	  deliberative	  –	  is	  both	  observed	  and	  called	  for.	  
All	  in	  all,	  the	  allegedly	  more	  flexible	  and	  cooperative	  nature	  of	  these	  new	  modes	  of	  governance	  are	  
claimed	   to	   better	   handle	   the	   wicked,	   uncertain	   and	   changing	   nature	   of	   environmental	   pressures.	  
Bäckstrand	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  refer	  to	  these	  normative	  assumptions	  as	  “the	  promise	  of	  new	  modes	  of	  gov-­‐
ernance”,	  whose	  empirical	  foundations	  however	  remain	  weak	  in	  their	  opinion	  (in	  the	  same	  vein,	  see	  
Newig	  &	  Fritsch	  2009).	  The	  crafting	  of	  ‘new’	  or	  ‘original’	  responses	  have	  generally	  been	  restricted	  to	  
the	  policy	  formulation	  phase.	  Surprisingly,	  very	  little	  attention	  has	  been	  devoted	  to	  innovation	  after	  
the	   programming	   stage,	   at	   the	   level	  where	   actors	   are	   directly	   confronted	   to	   environmental	   prob-­‐
lems.	  How	  the	  supposedly	  superior	  design	  of	  new	  modes	  of	  governance	  translate	  into	  innovative	  and	  
concrete	  actions	  hence	  remains	  to	  a	  wide	  extent	  an	  unthought	  of	   this	   literature,	   therefore	   limiting	  
theoretical	  claims	  to	  an	  expression	  of	  good	  deeds.	  
To	  the	  contrary,	  implementation	  studies	  represent	  a	  long	  and	  rich	  research	  tradition	  whose	  interest	  
precisely	   lies	   in	  the	  study	  of	  this	  “policy-­‐action	  relationship”	  (Barrett	  &	  Fudge	  1981).	  They	  focus	  on	  
the	  “missing	   link”	   (Hargrove	  1975)	  between	  expectations	  and	  realizations	  and,	  as	   such,	  could	  have	  
been	  central	  in	  examining	  endeavours	  of	  innovation	  at	  a	  more	  concrete	  level.	  However,	  this	  has	  not	  
been	  the	  case.	  Works	  within	  the	  sub-­‐discipline	  are,	   indeed,	  too	  narrowly	  conceived	  to	  fully	  capture	  
innovation	   processes.	   Although	   some	   scholars	   mentioned	   adjacent	   phenomena	   –	   Barrett	   &	   Hill	  
(1984)	   for	   instance	   talk	   about	   “specific	   innovation”	   to	   designate	   cases	  where	   concrete	   action	  pre-­‐
cedes	  a	  policy,	  questions	  related	  to	   the	   institutional	  creativity	  of	   ‘field’	  actors	   (Laesslé	  et	  al.	  2013),	  
innovation	   in	   implementation	  and	  action,	  or	  “positive	  gaps”	  are	   largely	   ignored.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  
even	  though	  they	  contributed	  to	  open	  up	  “the	  black	  box	  of	  policy	  making	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways”	  (Pa-­‐
lumbo	  &	  Calista	  1990:	  14),	   implementation	   studies	   fail	   in	  our	   view	   to	  provide	  an	  adequate	   frame-­‐
work	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  innovation	  endeavours.	  
1st International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP) University of Grenoble 




Against	  this	  background,	  we	  argue	  that	  the	  need	  to	  explore	  conceptually	  as	  well	  as	  empirically	  these	  
phenomena	   of	   innovation	   in	   action,	   or	   “innovative	   implementation”,	   appears	   vivid.	   The	   question	  
indeed	  arises	  as	  how	  to	  frame	  and	  comprehend	  collective	  action	  in	  a	  less	  pessimistic	  way	  than	  what	  
is	  usually	  proposed	  within	  implementation	  studies,	  and	  at	  a	  more	  concrete	  level	  than	  in	  the	  govern-­‐
ance(s)	  literature.	  The	  present	  paper	  more	  concretely	  pursues	  a	  two-­‐fold	  goal.	  Our	  general	  theoreti-­‐
cal	  aim	  is	  to	  broaden	  the	  understanding	  of	   implementation	  processes	  in	  order	  to	  better	  apprehend	  
the	  institutional	  and	  strategic	  creativity	  of	  ‘fields’	  actors	  embedded	  in	  ‘real-­‐life’	  situations	  while,	  on	  
the	  empirical	  level,	  our	  goal	  is	  to	  examine	  whether	  and	  under	  which	  conditions	  non-­‐state	  actors	  de-­‐
fending	  innovation	  strategies	  can	  come	  out	  as	  winners	  of	  these	  processes.	  	  
To	  do	  so,	  we	  propose	  an	  operationalization	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  “innovative	  implementation”	  as	  a	  strate-­‐
gy	  by	  which	  (coalitions	  of)	  actors	  seek	  to	  develop	  ad	  hoc,	  tailor-­‐made	  solutions	  that	  go	  beyond	  what	  
is	  provided	  for	  in	  formal	  policy	  designs.	  Following	  an	  inductive	  research	  strategy,	  we	  rely	  on	  a	  broad	  
conceptual	   framework	  whose	  main	  advantage	   is	   to	  bring	   the	  actors	  and	   their	   coalition	   (in	  all	   their	  
diversity)	  back	  in	  the	  analysis.	  More	  concretely,	  we	  state	  that	  perceiving	  implementation	  as	  broader	  
‘social	   interaction	  processes’	   (De	  Boer	  &	  Bressers	  2011)	  within	  which	  actors	  play	   strategic	   ‘games’	  
(Bardach	  1977,	  Scharpf	  1997)	  opens	  interesting	  lines	  of	  research	  to	  better	  account	  for	  the	  creativity	  
and	  strategic	  behaviours	  of	  field	  actors.	  In	  a	  second	  step,	  we	  apply	  our	  framework	  to	  three	  case	  stud-­‐
ies,	  with	   the	  goal	   to	   identify	   empirical	   regularities	   in	   the	   individual	   pathways	   related	   to	   the	  emer-­‐
gence	  and	  success	  (or	  failure)	  of	  innovation	  strategies.	  	  
General analytical framework 
In	  environmental	  as	  in	  other	  policy	  areas,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  course	  of	  action	  rarely	  follows	  mechani-­‐
cally	  the	  paths	  set	  out	  in	  policy	  designs,	  and	  that	  field	  actors	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  empty	  recipi-­‐
ents	  of	  general	  and	  abstract	  rules	  they	  are	  eager	  to	  bring	  into	  life	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  This	  explains	  why	  
the	  deficit	  –	  or	  gap,	  to	  borrow	  a	  less	  negatively	  connoted	  term	  (Dunsire	  1978:	  18)	  –	  between	  initial	  
expectations	   and	   effective	   realisations	   can	   be	  wide.	   In	   that	   respect	   however,	   if	   analyses	   of	   failed	  
implementation	   (leading	   to	   a	   well-­‐known	   negative	   gap)	   are	   common,	   endeavours	   of	   innovation	  
overpassing	  what	  is	  prescribed	  (and	  thus	  leading	  to	  a	  form	  of	  positive	  gap)	  are	  rarely	  accounted	  for.	  
We	  refer	  to	  these	  strategies	  by	  which	  actors	  seek	  to	  develop	  ad	  hoc	  solutions	  going	  beyond	  what	  is	  
provided	  for	  in	  policy	  designs	  as	  “innovative	  implementation”.	  As	  such,	  innovative	  implementation	  is	  
thus	   to	   distinguish	   from	   the	   “implementation	   of	   innovations”	   (O’Toole	   1997),	   which	   refers	   to	   the	  
translation	  into	  practice	  of	  governmental	  intention	  to	  innovate;	  here	  the	  intention	  clearly	  come	  from	  
non-­‐state	  actors	  embedded	  in	  concrete	  situations	  of	  collective	  action.	  
Although	   implementation	  studies	   represent	  a	   long	  and	  rich	   research	   tradition	  whose	   interests	  pre-­‐
cisely	  lie	  in	  the	  study	  of	  collective	  action,	  we	  argue	  that	  they	  are	  too	  narrowly	  conceived	  to	  fully	  cap-­‐
ture	  these	  processes	  of	   innovative	   implementation.	  This	   is	  not	   to	  say	  that	   the	  sub-­‐discipline	  repre-­‐
sent	  a	  unified	  field	  –	  clearly,	  “no	  general	  implementation	  theory	  has	  emerged”	  (Winter	  2012:	  256)	  –	  
but	  only	  to	  recognize	  that	  it	  remained	  dominated	  by	  (if	  not	  captive	  of)	  mainstream	  trends	  the	  long-­‐
enduring	  nature	  of	  which	  appears	  problematic.	   Schematically	  and	   in	  a	   voluntarily	   caricatured	  way,	  
implementation	  research	  tends	  to	  adopt	  a	  “straightforward	  ‘top-­‐down’	  orientation”	  (Hupe	  2011:	  65),	  
with	  an	  inclination	  to	  consider	  concrete	  action	  mainly	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  transmission	  and	  application	  
of	   legislative	  provisions	  decided	  at	   the	   top.	  The	   focus	   is	  on	   ‘goal	   compliance’	   (Winter	  2012),	  and	  a	  
rather	  pessimistic	  tone	  is	  widespread	  (Hill	  &	  Hupe	  2009:	  45),	  reflected	  in	  research	  questions	  formu-­‐
lated	   in	   terms	  of	  barriers,	  deficits,	  or	  problems	   (e.g.,	  Nilsson	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Dupuis	  &	  Knoepfel	  2011).	  
The	  perspective	  is	  relatively	  state-­‐centred,	  and	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  interactions	  between	  the	  top-­‐	  and	  
street-­‐levels	  of	  the	  administration	  rather	  than	  to	  explore	  what	  might	  stimulate	  innovative	  strategies	  
among	  civil	  society	  actors.	  Concretely,	  what	  has	  to	  be	  explained	  are	  the	  negative	  gaps	  between	  the	  
goals	  of	  a	  sectoral	  policy	  and	  the	  outputs,	  impacts	  or	  outcomes.	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This	   traditional	  approach	  reveals	  a	  “myopic	  nature”	   (Jochim	  &	  May	  2010:	  204)	   that,	   in	  our	  view,	   is	  
problematic	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  analysis	  of	  collective	  action	  as	  whole.	   If	   “explaining	   […]	   the	  way	  
policy	  intention	  influences	  policy	  action	  is	  the	  research	  agenda”	  (O’Toole	  2000:	  283),	  then	  there	  is	  a	  
strong	  need	  for	  an	  “appropriate	  broadening”	  (Ibid.;	  in	  the	  same	  vein,	  Hill	  &	  Hupe	  2009:	  16).	  The	  pro-­‐
posed	  analytical	   framework1	  must	  precisely	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  attempt	   to	  do	  so.	   It	   relies	  on	  the	  two	  
core	  beliefs	  that,	   first,	  a	  “continued	  awareness	  of	  the	  […]	  bottom-­‐up	  challenge	  remains	   important”	  
(Hill	  &	  Hupe	  2009:	  58)	  given	  the	  dominance	  of	  a	  top-­‐down	  perspective	  and	  that,	  second,	   the	  need	  
“to	  set	   implementation	  research	   in	  a	  political	  science	  setting”	  (Hjern	  &	  Hull	  1982:	  105)	   is	  still	  vivid.	  
More	  concretely,	   implementation	  processes	  are	  understood	  as	  broader	  “social	   interaction	  process-­‐
es”	  (De	  Boer	  &	  Bressers	  2011)	  within	  which	  actors	  pursue	  diverse	  strategies	  –	  “innovative	  implemen-­‐
tation”	  being	  one	  of	  them.	  	  
In	  line	  with	  bottom-­‐up	  scholars	  who	  advocated	  a	  focus	  on	  problem	  solving	  rather	  than	  goal	  achieve-­‐
ment	  (Winter	  2012:	  257),	  the	  analytical	  lens	  consists	  of	  a	  given	  (set	  of)	  problem(s).	  We	  assume	  that	  
the	   actors	   engaged	   in	   social	   interaction	   process	   “are	   bound	   together	   by	   a	   common	   problem	   that	  
needs	  to	  be	  collectively	  solved”	  (Khan	  2010:	  199).	  In	  that	  sense,	  the	  problem	  as	  socially	  constructed	  
by	  the	  relevant	  actors	  represents	  the	  starting	  point.	  In	  our	  case,	  that	  means	  the	  analytical	  lens	  con-­‐
sists	  of	  a	  concrete	  environment-­‐related	  problem,	  covering	  a	   large	  spectrum	  of	  potential	   issues	   (re-­‐
source	  depletion,	  pollution	  level,	  disaster	  risks,	  etc.).	  	  
The	  proposed	  framework	  (see	  figure	  1)	  maintains	  the	  ‘process’	  perspective	  inherent	  to	  implementa-­‐
tion	  studies,	  assuming	  that	  “several	  inputs	  are	  […]	  ‘processed’	  into	  something	  new	  and	  different”	  (De	  
Boer	  &	  Bressers	  2011:	  60).	  This	  is	  thus	  a	  conversion	  process	  we	  are	  talking	  about,	  not	  a	  temporal	  one.	  
Each	  component	  –	  inputs,	  process	  in	  itself,	  and	  results	  –	  is	  conceptualized	  as	  to	  emphasize	  both	  the	  
“multi-­‐layered	  structural	  context”	  of	  collective	  action	  and	  the	  “role	  of	  multiple	  social	  actors	  in	  arrays	  
of	  negotiation,	  implementation,	  and	  service	  delivery”	  (O’Toole	  2000:	  276)	  
The	  concept	  of	  ‘Institutional	  Regime’	  (Knoepfel	  2007,	  Gerber	  et	  al.	  2009)	  is,	  first,	  substituted	  to	  nar-­‐
rower	   notions	   of	   ‘policy	   design’	   or	   ‘boundary-­‐spanning	   regime’	   (Jochim	  &	  May	   2010).	   Recognizing	  
that	  policy	  designs	  are	  not	  the	  only	  overarching	  institutions	  having	  a	  strong	  impact	  on	  environmental	  
issues,	  institutional	  regimes	  also	  integrate	  the	  influence	  of	  property	  regimes	  (well-­‐known	  to	  institu-­‐
tional	   economists,	   cf.	   Bromley	   1992;	   Schlager	   &	  Ostrom	   1992).	  More	   concretely,	   they	   regroup	   all	  
general	  and	  abstract	  provisions	  related	  to	  a	  given	  resource,	  as	  part	  of	  either	  public	  policies	  (in	  a	  mul-­‐
ti-­‐sectorial	  perspective)	  or	  property	  regimes.	  Embedded	  in	  wider	  and	  case-­‐specific	  layers	  of	  context,	  
they	  represent	  a	  set	  of	  constraints	  and	  opportunities	  shaping	  actors’	  choice	  and	  behaviour.	  	  
Second,	   implementation	  processes	  are	  extended	  to	  more	  complex	  ‘social	   interaction	  processes’	  (De	  
Boer	   &	   Bressers	   2011)	   within	   which	   (coalitions	   of)	   actors	   play	   strategic	   ‘games’	   (Bardach	   1977,	  
Scharpf	  1997).	  The	  idea	  of	  games	  thus	  serves	  
as	  a	  master	  metaphor	  that	  directs	  attention	  and	  stimulates	  insight.	   It	  directs	  us	  to	  look	  at	  the	  
players,	  what	  they	  regard	  as	  the	  stakes,	  their	  strategies	  and	  tactics,	  their	  resources	  for	  playing	  
the	   rules	  of	  play	   (which	   stipulates	   the	   conditions	   for	  winning),	   the	   rules	  of	   “fair”	   play	   (which	  
stipulate	  the	  boundaries	  beyond	  which	  lie	  fraud	  or	  illegitimacy),	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  communica-­‐
tions	  (or	  lack	  of	  them)	  among	  the	  players,	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  the	  possi-­‐
ble	  outcomes.	  (Bardach	  1977:	  56)	  
	  
	  
                                                
1	  An	  earlier	  version	  of	  the	  framework	  was	  presented	  in	  April	  2013	  at	  a	  cycle	  of	  seminar	  on	  policy	  implementation	  held	  at	  
the	  University	  of	  Lausanne	  (Schweizer	  2013,	  available	  online	  in	  French).	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More	  particularly,	   the	  game	  metaphor	   supposes	   to	  decompose	   the	  black	  box	   that	   interaction	  pro-­‐
cesses	   represent	   in	   three	  elements:	   the	   structure	  of	   the	  actors’	  network	   (which	  actors	   are	  playing	  
and	  how	  do	   they	   interact?);	   their	   endowment	   in	  policy	   resources	   (which	   cards	   are	   they	  holding?);	  
their	  interests	  and	  the	  strategies	  they	  pursue	  (which	  cards	  do	  they	  play?	  are	  they	  trying	  to	  cheat?	  to	  
play	  in	  creative	  and	  innovative	  ways?).	  	  
Finally,	  the	  results	  of	  these	  social	   interaction	  processes	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  threefold:	  bringing	  to-­‐
gether	  all	   the	   concrete	  decisions,	  bilateral	   contracts	  or	   community	  agreements	   reached	  by	   the	  ac-­‐
tors,	   ‘regulatory	  arrangements’	  (Schweizer	  &	  Knoepfel	  2011)	  are	  considered	  as	  the	  output;	   impacts	  
(Knoepfel	  et	  al.	  2011:	  244)	  refer	  to	  the	  effects	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  more	  specifically	  on	  the	  actors’	  be-­‐
haviour;	  feedback	  loops	  on	  the	  institutional	  regimes	  are,	  in	  a	  last	  step,	  also	  considered.	  All	  in	  all,	  the-­‐
se	  three	  levels	  materialize	  different	  degree	  of	  success	  of	  a	  given	  strategy	  in	  the	  social	  reality,	  some-­‐
how	  determining	  the	  winners	  and	  losers	  of	  the	  game.	  	  
Figure	  1:	  analytical	  framework	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  social	  interaction	  process	  
	  
Source:	  adapted	  from	  Schweizer	  (2013:	  14)	  
	  
Specific operationalization 
The	  analytical	  framework	  developed	  in	  figure	  2	   is,	   in	  comparison	  to	  the	  traditional	  approach	  of	   im-­‐
plementation	  studies,	  more	  appropriate	  to	  capture	  the	  wicked	  nature	  of	  environmental	   issues,	   the	  
complexity	  of	   collective	   action	  addressing	   them	  and,	   last	   but	  not	   least,	   phenomena	  of	   “innovative	  
implementation”.	  Designed	  as	  a	  comprehensive	   framework,	   it	   aims	  at	  addressing	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  
research	  questions,	  with	  a	  large	  range	  of	  potential	  (in)dependent	  variables	  and	  causal	  assumptions.	  
In	  that	  sense,	  the	  framework	  is	  nothing	  but	  a	  focus,	  a	  way	  of	  organizing	  thoughts	  and	  driving	  schol-­‐
ars’	  attention.	  The	  operationalization	  and	  exact	  weight	  given	   to	  each	  element	  will	   then	  depend	  on	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The	   rest	   of	   this	   contribution	   precisely	   consists	   in	   an	   operationalization	   and	   confrontation	   of	   this	  
framework	  to	  empirical	  reality.	  As	  far	  as	  this	  paper	  is	  concerned,	  the	  attention	  is	  centred	  on	  strate-­‐
gies	  of	  “innovative	   implementation”.	  Through	  three	  case	  studies,	  we	  more	  particularly	  address	   the	  
question	   of	  whether	   and	   under	  which	   conditions	   non-­‐state	   actors	   defending	   innovation	   strategies	  
can	  come	  out	  as	  winners	  of	  social	  interaction	  processes.	  The	  dependant	  variable	  consists	  in	  the	  suc-­‐
cess	  or	  failure	  of	  a	  strategy	  of	  innovative	  implementation	  (point	  3),	  and	  the	  main	  explanatory	  varia-­‐
bles	   of	   interests	   in	   the	   endogenous	   elements	   of	   the	   social	   interaction	   process	   (point	   2).	   As	   these	  
processes	  do	  not	  take	  place	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  the	  influence	  of	  contexts	  and	  exogenous	  variables	  will	  also	  
be	  questioned	  (point	  1).	  
1.	  Inputs	  
Inputs	  represent	  a	  set	  of	  constraints	  and	  opportunities	  that	  shape	  actors’	  choice	  and	  behaviour	  and,	  
therefore,	   influence	  to	  some	  extent	  the	  results	  of	  a	  given	  process.	  We	  distinguish	  three	  embedded	  
layers	  of	  context:	  wider	  (problem	  nature,	  socio-­‐economic,	  political,	  etc.	  trends);	  institutional	  (institu-­‐
tional	  regime);	  and	  case-­‐specific	  (regulations,	  circumstances	  or	  events	  specific	  to	  the	  case	  under	  in-­‐
quiry).	  More	  precisely,	  institutional	  regimes	  refer	  to	  the	  general	  and	  abstract	  rules	  related	  to	  a	  given	  
resource	  or	  issue,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  two	  steering	  dimensions:	  the	  policy	  designs	  in	  a	  cross-­‐sectoral	  per-­‐
spective	  (public	  law),	  and	  the	  property	  regimes	  (private	  law).	  In	  each	  case,	  institutional	  regimes	  are	  
characterized	  by	  a	  specific	  extent	   (number	  of	  provisions)	  and	  coherence	   (coordination	  between	  ob-­‐
jectives	  and	  instruments,	  potentially	  competing	  regulation	  logics,	  etc.)	  and	  can	  be	  qualified	  as	  weak	  
(low	  extent),	  complex	  (high	  extent	  but	  low	  coherence),	  or	  strong	  (high	  extent	  and	  high	  coherence).	  	  
2.	  Social	  interaction	  process	  
Social	  interaction	  processes	  are	  composed	  of	  three	  interrelated	  groups	  of	  endogenous	  variables:	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  actors’	  networks;	  their	  policy	  resources	  endowment;	  and	  their	  competing	  interests	  
and	  strategies.	  
2a.	  Networks	  structure	  
The	   first	   component	   is	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   networks	   within	   which	   actors	   (i.e.	   the	   players	   of	   the	  
game)	  are	  embedded,	  related	  to	  the	  success	  of	  innovation	  strategies	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  acts	  as	  op-­‐
erational	  rules	  which	  restrict	  the	  access	  of	  actors	  to	  the	  decision	  arena	  and	  constrain	  their	  capacity	  
to	  act	   (Schlager	  &	  Ostrom	  1992).	  By	   ‘actors’,	  we	   refer	   to	  both	   state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  be	   they	  
target	  groups,	  beneficiaries,	  or	  third	  parties	  (Knoepfel	  et	  al.	  2011:	  57).	  Relying	  on	  the	  contributions	  of	  
Tichy	  et	  al.	  (1979),	  Waarden	  (2006)	  and	  Dupuis	  &	  Knoepfel	  (2013),	  we	  identify	  three	  dimensions	  to	  
characterize	  these	  networks	  (figure	  2):	  the	  openness	  (the	  greater	  the	  number	  of	  actors,	  the	  stronger	  
the	  openness),	   the	   type	  of	   coordination	   (vertical	   and	  hierarchical	   vs.	  horizontal	   and	  heterarchical),	  
and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relations	  (from	  non-­‐cooperation	  based	  on	  confrontation	  to	  cooperation	  based	  
on	  trust,	  with	  bargaining	  interactions	  based	  on	  an	  exchange	  of	  policy	  resources	  in-­‐between).	  In	  each	  
case,	  the	  interactions	  between	  these	  elements	  are	  complex	  and	  in	  permanent	  evolution,	  and	  differ-­‐
ent	  coalitions	  of	  actors	  are	  likely	  to	  emerge.	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Figure	  2:	  continuum	  of	  modes	  of	  interactions	  
	  
2b.	  Policy	  resources	  
Each	  actor	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  capacity	  of	  action	  (i.e.	  a	  ‘hand’	  of	  cards)	  that	  determines	  precarious,	  
ever-­‐evolving	  balances	  of	  power	  within	  the	  actors’	  networks.	  To	  apprehend	  this	  capacity	  of	  action,	  
we	  rely	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  policy	  resources	  endowment	  (Knoepfel	  et	  al.	  2011),	  which	  brings	  together	  all	  
the	   “resources	   that	   public	   and	   private	   actors	  will	   be	   able	   (or	   not)	   to	   produce	   and	  mobilise	   in	   the	  
course	  of	  the	  policy	  formulation	  and	  implementation	  processes”	  (p.69).	  Knoepfel	  et	  al.	  (2011:	  69ss)	  
identify	  ten	  of	   them,	  which	  can	  be	  combined,	  conserved,	  or	  exchanged	  by	  actors	   in	  order	  to	  reach	  
their	  objectives:	   law,	  personnel,	  money,	   information,	  organisation,	   consensus,	   time,	   infrastructure,	  
political	   support,	   and	   force.	   Among	   them,	   a	   specific	   focus	   will	   be	   put	   on	   those	   more	   specifically	  
linked	   to	   the	   capacity	   to	   initiate	  and	   foster	   coalitions:	  organisation	   (which	   refers,	   inter	  alia,	   to	   the	  
capacity	   to	   organise	   collaborative	   interaction	   or	   to	   the	   presence	   of	   shared	   values)	   and	   consensus	  
(which	  refers,	  inter	  alia,	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  trust-­‐based	  interaction).	  	  
2c.	  Interests	  &	  strategy	  
The	  actors	  who	  are	  bound	  by	  a	  collective	  problem	  and	  engaged	   into	   the	  social	   interaction	  process	  
addressing	  it	  can	  pursue	  diverse	  strategies,	  which	  we	  define	  in	  relation	  with	  the	  institutional	  regime.	  
In	  fact,	  depending	  on	  their	  position	  in	  the	  actors’	  network	  and	  their	  endowment	  in	  policy	  resources,	  
on	  the	  specific	   interests	  they	  pursue	  (personal	  vs.	  altruistic;	  substantive	  vs.	  political;	  etc.)	  and	  their	  
capacity	  to	  build	  coalitions	  around	  those,	  actors	  will	  choose	  the	  strategy	  they	  perceive	  as	  the	  most	  
suited	  to	  their	  objectives.	  Passivity,	  concretisation,	  diversion,	  circumvention,	  innovation	  are	  the	  five	  
potential	  competing	  strategies	  we	  identified	  in	  an	  earlier	  contribution	  (Schweizer	  2013):	  
-­‐ Passivity:	  when	  an	  actor	  choose	  not	  to	  act	  (i.e.	  not	  to	  mobilize	  or	  refer	  to	  a	  given	  rule)	  in	  order	  
to	  favour	  the	  status	  quo	  (deliberate	  inaction),	  or	  when	  inaction	  is	  not	  a	  choice	  but	  is	  induced	  
by	  an	  insufficient	  endowment	  in	  policy	  resources	  (suffered	  inaction)	  
-­‐ Implementation:	  when	  an	  actor	  seeks	  to	  implement	  a	  rule	  or	  activate	  a	  right	  as	  closely	  as	  pos-­‐
sible	  to	  its	  formulation	  and	  its	  intent	  
-­‐ Diversion:	  when	  an	  actor	  seeks	  to	   implement	  a	  rule	  or	  activate	  a	  right	  to	  other	  ends	  than	  in-­‐
tended	  in	  its	  formulation	  
-­‐ Circumvention:	  when	  an	  actor	   tries	   to	  resist	   to	   the	   implementation	  of	  a	  given	  rule,	  either	  by	  
invoking	  another	  one,	  or	  by	  knowing	  that	  its	  behaviour	  won’t	  be	  punished	  (circumvention	  ‘en	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-­‐ 	  Innovative	  implementation:	  when	  an	  actor	  tries	  to	  develop	  an	  ad	  hoc,	  tailor-­‐made	  solution	  to	  
address	  a	  given	  problem,	  going	  further	  than	  what	  is	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  institutional	  regime	  
In	  this	  research,	  a	  specific	  focus	  will	  be	  put	  on	  strategies	  of	  innovation	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  	  
3.	  Results	  
The	  success	  or	  failure	  of	   innovation	  strategies	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  dependant	  variable.	  An	  actor-­‐based	  
perspective	   is	  adopted	  to	  assess	   this	  variable,	  which	  will	  be	  qualified	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	   the	  
(coalition	  of)	  actors	  pursuing	  the	  innovation	  strategy.	  More	  concretely,	  we	  will	  evaluate	  the	  degree	  
of	  success	  of	  an	  innovation	  strategy	  by	  answering	  questions	  related	  to	  three	  criteria:	  	  
-­‐ outputs:	  do	  the	  (coalition	  of)	  actor(s)	  obtain	  a	  modification	  of	  the	  regulatory	  arrangement	  in	  
a	  way	   that	   is	   congruent	  with	   their	   strategy?	   (i.e.	   formal	   or	   informal	  materialization	   in	   the	  
regulatory	  arrangement)	  
-­‐ impacts:	   in	  the	  continuity,	  do	  the	  (coalition	  of)	  actor(s)	  obtain	  a	  modification	  of	  the	  actors’	  
behaviour	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  congruent	  with	  their	  strategy?	  (i.e.	  effects	  in	  the	  ‘real’	  world)	  
-­‐ feedback	  loops:	  do	  the	  (coalition	  of)	  actor(s)	  obtain	  a	  modification	  of	  the	  institutional	  regime	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  congruent	  with	  their	  strategy?	  (i.e.	  institutionalization	  of	  the	  strategy	  and	  po-­‐
tential	  transfer	  to	  other	  cases)	  
Each	  of	  these	  criteria	  will	  be	  evaluated	  on	  a	  scale	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  answer	  given	  to	  the	  related	  ques-­‐
tions:	  yes,	  partly,	  or	  no.	  This	  approach	  is	  in	  our	  opinion	  interesting	  for	  two	  reasons.	  Because,	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	   it	  sets	  a	  standard	  for	  evaluating	  the	  degree	  of	  success	  of	  a	  given	  strategy	  from	  an	  actor-­‐
centred	   perspective;	   and	   because,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   brings	   back	   into	   the	   analysis	   the	   seminal	  
question	  of	  ‘who	  gets	  what,	  when	  and	  how’	  (Lasswell	  1936),	  that	  is	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  winners	  
and	  losers	  of	  the	  game.	  
Methods 
The	  research	  is	  at	  the	  interplay	  between	  theory-­‐testing	  and	  theory-­‐building	  (Eisenhardt	  1989),	  with	  
the	  primary	  goal	  of	  broadening	  our	  understandings	  of	  implementation	  processes,	  and	  the	  secondary	  
goal	  of	  strengthening	  empirical	  knowledge	  regarding	  endeavours	  of	  innovative	  implementation.	  De-­‐
spite	  an	  important	  conceptual	  and	  theoretical	  background,	  we	  followed	  a	  mainly	  inductive	  logic.	  The	  
operationalization	   of	   the	   analytical	   framework	   was	   indeed	   not	   given	   a	   priori,	   but	   progressively	  
emerged	   through	   constantly	   going	   back	   and	   forth	   between	   the	   existing	   literature,	   conceptual	   as-­‐
sumptions,	  and	  empirical	  observations.	  This	  concretely	  resulted	  in	  a	  research	  process	  neither	  linear,	  
nor	  mechanical,	  but	  that	  rather	  went	  in	  fits	  and	  starts	  –	  the	  conceptual,	  methodological	  and	  empiri-­‐
cal	  always	  going	  hand	  in	  hand	  in	  an	  iterative	  process.	  	  
The	  research	  design	  is	  case-­‐centred,	  comparative,	  and	  explorative,	  relying	  on	  the	  “intensive	  investi-­‐
gation	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  cases”	  (Hall	  2008:	  304).	   It	   is	   ‘case-­‐centred’	  because	   it	  aims	  to	  grab	  the	  
singularity	  of	  each	  case	  under	   investigation,	  those	  being	  defined	  as	  bounded	  empirical	  phenomena	  
composed	  of	  “complex	  configurations	  of	  events	  and	  structures”	  (Ragin	  2000:	  57);	  ‘comparative’	  be-­‐
cause	   it	   assumes	   that	   “knowledge	   can	   be	   derived	   directly	   from	   the	   study	   of	   cross-­‐case	   patterns”	  
(Ibid.),	   and	   therefore	  aims	   to	  highlight	  empirical	   regularities	   across	   cases	   in	  order	   “to	   increase	   the	  
confidence	  that	  the	  causal	  process	  observed	  is	  not	  idiosyncratic	  in	  one	  of	  them”	  (Hall	  2008:	  315);	  and	  
‘explorative’	  because	  we	  decided	  not	  to	  formulate	  ex	  ante	  causal	  hypothesis	  at	  this	  stage,	  but	  rather	  
to	  test	  more	  generally	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  framework	  developed	  in	  figure	  1.	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In	  more	  details,	  each	  of	  the	  three	  cases	  under	   inquiry	   is	  centred	  on	  a	  specific	  environmental	  or	  re-­‐
sourcial	   issue	   that	   constitutes	   the	   starting	   point	   of	   the	   analysis:	   a	   water	   catchment	   protection	   in	  
Lombok	  island,	  Indonesia	  (specific	  issue:	  reforestation	  of	  watersheds);	  an	  industrial	  landfill	  in	  Bonfol,	  
Switzerland	  (specific	  issue:	  remediation	  of	  contaminated	  sites);	  and	  an	  irrigation	  network	  in	  Nendaz,	  
Switzerland	  (specific	   issue:	  prevention	  and	  reparation	  of	  flood	  risks).	  The	  focus	  is	  put	  on	  the	  collec-­‐
tive	  action	  addressing	  these	  issues	  at	  a	  very	  local	  level,	  with	  a	  specific	  emphasis	  on	  the	  strategies	  of	  
non-­‐state	  actors.	  The	  three	  cases	  were	  selected	  among	  the	  wide	  pool	  of	  empirical	  knowledge	  pro-­‐
vided	   by	   our	   respective	   field	   works	   (numerous	   in-­‐depth	   case	   studies).	   Not	   as	   formalized	   as	   what	  
more	  deductive	  approaches	  would	  require,	   the	  selection	  was	  based	  on	  an	   intuitive	  and	  empirically	  
grounded	  process.	  The	  elements	  taken	   into	  account	  were	   in	  that	  sense	  some	  specific	   features	  that	  
made	   the	   cases	   empirically	   relevant	  with	   regards	   to	   our	   research	   question.	  With	   the	   goal	   to	   shed	  
light	  on	  regularities	  related	  to	  the	  “the	  particular	  pathways	  that	   individual	  cases	  follow	  to	  arrive	  at	  
their	  specific	  values	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable”	   (Mahoney	  &	  Goertz	  2010	  :	  237)	   in	  highly	  different	  
context,	  we	  applied	  the	  following	  logic:	  we	  chose	  what	  we	  perceived	  as	  highly	  different	  cases	  within	  
which	   a	   (coalition	  of)	   non-­‐state	   actor(s)	   tried	   to	   pursue	   an	   innovation	   strategy	   (invariant).	   Table	   3	  
recapitulate	  the	  main	  characteristics	  taken	  into	  account:	  
Table	  1:	  Description	  of	  cases	  characteristics	  
Case	   Type	  of	  issue	   Context	  
Lombok	  
(Indonesia)	  
-­‐ reforestation	  of	  	  	  
watersheds	   -­‐ emerging	  country	  
Nendaz	  
(Switzerland)	  
-­‐ prevention	  and	  repa-­‐
ration	  of	  flood	  risks	  	  




-­‐ remediation	  of	  a	  
contaminated	  site	  
-­‐ most	  developed	  
liberal-­‐democracy	  
	   	  
1st International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP) University of Grenoble 





Case	  1:	  reforestation	  of	  watersheds	  in	  Lombok	  (Indonesia)	  2	  
1.	  Inputs:	  embedded	  layers	  of	  context	  
A	  traditional	  way	  to	  efficiently	  produce	  drinking	  water	  is	  to	  catch	  raw	  water	  from	  underground	  aqui-­‐
fers	   in	   (or	  under)	   forest	  areas.	  Trees	  provide	  a	  passive	  protection	   (few	  activities)	  and	  forest	  soil	  an	  
active	   service	   of	   filtration	   and	   purification.	   This	  widely	   known	   natural	   interdependence	   is	   used	   all	  
over	  the	  world.	  Because	  any	  changes	  in	  the	  land	  uses	  upstream	  impact	  the	  water	  quantity	  and	  quali-­‐
ty	  of	  the	  springs	  downstream,	  regulations	  of	  recharging	  areas	  appear	  to	  be	  central.	  	  
In	  Indonesia,	  however,	  the	  situation	  is	  problematic	  in	  that	  respect.	  Following	  the	  decentralization	  at	  
the	  beginning	  of	   the	  2000s,	  a	   collapse	  of	   the	  state	  authoritarian	  control	  over	   forests	  has	  been	  ob-­‐
served.	   The	   island	   of	   Lombok	   in	   Eastern	   Indonesia	   experienced	   a	   so	   intensive	   deforestation	   and	  
transformation	  of	  forests	  into	  gardens	  that	  the	  provincial	  environment	  agency	  noticed	  that	  50%	  the	  
springs	  had	  dried	  up.	  On	  a	  small	  arid	  island	  with	  limited	  water	  resources	  and	  increasing	  needs	  of	  an	  
urbanizing	  population,	  where	  desalination	  is	  not	  affordable,	  this	  “Forest	  for	  Water”	  issue	  is	  vital.	  	  
These	  destructions	  took	  place	  in	  a	  context	  of	  unclear	  property	  rights	  attribution	  and	  lacunar	  sectoral	  
public	  policies.	  Property	  rights	  definition	  is	  problematic	  because	  the	  ministry	  of	  forestry	  claims	  exclu-­‐
sive	  ownership	  where	   local	  communities	  consider	   forests	  as	  their	  traditional	   lands.	  Simultaneously,	  
the	  very	  sectorial	  approach	  of	  the	  forest	  policy	  limits	  the	  implementation	  of	  water	  protection	  in	  for-­‐
est	  areas.	  The	   institutional	   regime	  must	   thus	  be	  considered	  as	  weak	   in	   the	  present	  case,	  with	  only	  
limited	  effects	  on	  concrete	  land	  use	  behaviors.	  	  
Since	   the	   mid-­‐2000s,	   ecological	   economists	   have	   promoted	   Payments	   for	   Environmental	   Services	  
(PES)	  to	  solve	  such	  problems.	  Based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  “coasean	  transaction”,	  PES	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  pub-­‐
lic	  regulation	  but	  consist	  of	  bilateral	  agreements.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  beneficiaries	  of	  environmental	  ser-­‐
vices	  (in	  the	  present	  case	  the	  water	  consumers)	  should	  pay	  the	  service	  providers	  (the	  land	  users),	  in	  
order	  to	  adapt	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  latter	  and,	   in	  doing	  so,	  guarantee	  the	  service.	   In	  a	  weak	   institu-­‐
tional	  context	  such	  as	  the	  one	  related	  to	  the	  Indonesian	  forests,	  much	  hope	  has	  been	  put	  on	  PES.	  
2.	  Social	  interaction	  process:	  actors’	  network,	  policy	  resources,	  interests	  and	  strategies	  
West	  Lombok	  regional	  administration	   failed	  to	  protect	   forests	   in	   the	  recharging	  areas	  of	   the	  water	  
catchments.	  Observing	  the	  degradation,	  different	  local	  actors	  decided	  to	  work	  together	  to	  promote	  
PES	  as	  an	  alternative:	  the	  regional	  water	  supply	  company	  (PDAM),	  the	  regional	  program	  of	  the	  WWF	  
Indonesia	   (WWF-­‐NT),	   and	   a	   NGO	   supporting	   local	   communities	   (Konsepsi).	   This	   activism	   was	   not	  
oriented	  by	  chance,	  but	  was	  a	  clear	  strategy	  to	  attract	  attention	  and	  funding	  through	  the	  implemen-­‐
tation	  of	  a	  new	  type	  of	  regulatory	  arrangement.	  With	  limited	  policy	  resources,	  but	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  
opportunities	  around	  PES,	   the	  coalition	   raised	  support	   from	   international	  actors	   (ICRAF,	  UNDP	  and	  
Ford	  Foundation).	  In	  short,	  they	  managed	  to	  “surf	  the	  wave”	  of	  the	  PES	  trend.	  In	  accordance	  to	  our	  
framework,	   this	   initial	  actors’	  network	  can	  be	  described	  as	  widely	  open,	  with	  cooperative	  relations	  
and	  heterarchical	  type	  of	  coordination. Members	  mobilized	  organization,	  consensus	  and	  information	  
policy	  resources	  to	  obtain	  financial	  and	  communication	  support	  from	  international	  actors.	  
The	   coalition	   started	   by	   documenting	   the	   problem,	   assessing	   the	   value	   of	   the	   environmental	   ser-­‐
vices,	   and	  measuring	   the	   water	   consumers’	   willingness	   to	   pay.	   Based	   on	   encouraging	   results,	   the	  
coalition	   tried	   to	   implement	   pilot-­‐projects.	   This	   paved	   the	   way	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   punctual	  
arrangements	   (in	   form	  of	  PES),	  which	  turned	   in	  a	  second	  phase	   into	  a	  regional	   incentive	  policy	  de-­‐
                                                
2	  The	  detailed	  Lombok	  case	  study	  will	  be	  published	  soon	  (De	  Buren	  2013)	  and	  available	  online.	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signed	  to	  secure	  the	  “Forest	  for	  Water”	  service	  in	  West	  Lombok.	  The	  PES	  were	  indeed	  innovative,	  but	  
circumvented	  the	  regional	  administration.	   Initially	  only	  an	  observer,	   the	  regional	  government	  man-­‐
aged	  in	  2007	  to	  take	  the	  lead	  by	  promulgating	  a	  regional	  regulation	  on	  environmental	  services	  man-­‐
agement.	  This	  transition	  is	  a	  highly	  complex	  process	  during	  which	  the	  early	  coalition	  managed	  to	  be	  
incorporated	  in	  the	  new	  implementation	  structure.	  For	  the	  regional	  government,	  this	  embedment	  of	  
the	   scheme	   in	   a	   policy	   is	   a	  way	   to	   control	   the	  process	   and	   the	  money	   transfers.	  According	   to	  our	  
framework,	  the	  openness	  decreased,	  the	  interaction	  became	  more	  hierarchical,	  and	  relations	  turned	  
to	  bargaining	  type	  involving	  policy	  resources	  such	  as	  political	  support	  and	  consensus.	  
3.	  Results:	  outputs,	  impacts	  and	  feedback	  loops	  
We	  consider	  the	  results	  of	  the	  described	  process	  as	  a	  successful	  innovation	  strategy	  in	  reference	  to	  
our	  indicators	  (outputs	  –	  impacts	  –	  feedbacks	  on	  the	  institutional	  regime).	  -­‐ Outputs	  (yes):	  the	  local	  actor’s	  coalition	  managed	  to	  implement	  some	  PES,	  a	  success	  that	  has	  
been	  widely	  praised	  and	  communicated.	  The	  concrete	  activities	  consist	  of	  reforestation	  and	  
land	  use	  conversion	  (rice	  fields	  transformed	  in	  agro-­‐forest	  plots).	  -­‐ Feedbacks	  (yes):	  the	  communication	  around	  this	  output	  led,	  in	  a	  second	  step,	  to	  a	  more	  cru-­‐
cial	  result:	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  incentive	  regional	  policy	  by	  which	  farmer	  groups	  have	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  request	   funding	   for	  afforestation	  activities	  and	   local	  community	  strengthen-­‐
ing	  activities.	   In	  order	   to	   cover	   the	   costs	  of	   these	  activities,	   the	   regional	   government	   set	  a	  
new	  tax	  on	  water	  consumption.	  In	  that	  sense,	  the	  payments	  switched	  from	  voluntary	  trans-­‐
actions	  (bilateral)	  to	  a	  compulsory	  fee	  and	  a	  decision	  to	  allocate	  funds	  (unilateral).	  Thus,	  the	  
new	  policy	   deleted	   the	   initial	   PES	   and	   created	   a	   new	   type	  of	   actors’	   network.	   This	   change	  
came	  through	  a	  modification	  of	  the	  institutional	  regime	  that	  gave	  the	  opportunity	  to	  the	  two	  
NGOs	  to	  be	  embedded	  in	  the	  implementation	  structure,	  thus	  strengthening	  their	  position.	  -­‐ Impacts	   (no):	  an	  additional	  element	  to	  be	  discussed	   is	   the	  apparent	   lack	  of	   impact.	  The	  re-­‐
gional	  incentive	  policy	  is	  implemented	  without	  any	  targeting	  based	  on	  hydrogeological	  stud-­‐
ies.	  This	  means	  that	  activities	  are	  conducted	  independently	  of	  their	  benefits	  for	  ground	  wa-­‐
ters,	  sometimes	  far	  away	  from	  water	  catchments.	  Based	  on	  that,	  we	  cannot	  describe	  a	  suc-­‐
cess	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	   impacts.	  However,	   from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  coalition	  mem-­‐
bers,	   this	  does	  not	  diminish	   the	   success	  of	   their	   strategy.	   Long	  discussions	  with	   them	  con-­‐
vinced	  us	  that	  their	  objectives	  were	  not	  limited	  to	  water	  protection,	  but	  more	  focused	  on	  the	  
achievement	  of	  PES,	   the	  politicization	  of	   the	   issue,	   the	  capture	  of	  external	   funds,	  and	  their	  
own	  promotion.	  
4.	  Conclusion:	  explanatory	  factors	  of	  the	  results	  
This	  case	  shows	  how	  a	  non-­‐state	  actors’	  coalition	  can	  concretely	  influence	  a	  public	  policy.	  The	  specif-­‐
ic	  Lombok	  context,	  where	  the	  institutional	  regime	  is	  too	  weak	  to	  influence	  actors’	  behaviors,	  is	  a	  key	  
starting	  point.	  When	  mobilizing	  PES,	  actors	  did	  not	  plan	  to	  modify	  the	  institutional	  regime,	  but	  only	  
to	   create	  an	  ad	  hoc	   regulatory	  arrangement.	   The	  embedment,	  by	   the	   regional	   government,	  of	   the	  
PES	  scheme	  into	  a	  public	  policy	  is	  rather	  a	  consequence	  (feedback	  loops)	  of	  a	  first	  success	  in	  terms	  of	  
output.	  Thus,	  we	  consider	  it	  as	  a	  success	  even	  though	  it	  was	  not	  strategically	  planned	  at	  the	  begin-­‐
ning	   of	   the	   process.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   importance	   of	   (indirect)	   institutional	   stakes	   (communication,	  
marketing,	  funding	  capture,	  etc.)	  seems	  to	  be	  higher	  than	  the	  (direct)	  substantial	  issue	  (water	  quality	  
and	  quantity).	  The	  main	  result	  for	  the	  coalition’s	  members	  is	  also	  institutional:	  their	  embedment	  in	  
the	  policy	  implementation	  structure.	  In	  other	  words,	  their	  role	  and	  position	  in	  the	  network	  of	  actors	  
became	  institutionalized,	  granting	  them	  access	  to	  future	  decision-­‐making	  processes. 
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Case	  2:	  flood	  risks	  prevention	  and	  reparation	  in	  Nendaz	  (Switzerland)	  3	  
1.	  Inputs:	  embedded	  layers	  of	  context	  
Nendaz	   is	   a	   touristic	   resort	   situated	   in	   the	   Swiss	   alpine	   canton	   of	   Valais	  where,	   although	   tourism	  
replaced	  agriculture	  as	  the	  major	  economic	  activity	  in	  the	  1970s,	  the	  latter	  remains	  important.	  Like	  in	  
many	  other	  places	  of	  the	  canton,	  the	  crops	  grown	  there	  have	  been	  watered	  since	  time	  immemorial	  
by	  open-­‐sky	  water	  channels	  (bisses)	  hollowed	  out	  of	  the	  ground	  or	  attached	  to	  the	  sides	  of	  vertigi-­‐
nous	  precipices.	  Far	  from	  representing	  the	  relics	  of	  a	  bygone	  agro-­‐pastoral	  age,	  bisses	  are	  now	  con-­‐
ceived	   as	   “multifunctional	   objects”	   (Reynard	   2005)	   at	   the	   interface	   between	   agriculture	   (mean	   of	  
supplying	  irrigation	  water)	  and	  tourism	  (hiking	  on	  their	  maintenance	  paths).	  
This	   diversification	   of	   uses	   does	   however	   not	   go	   without	   saying.	   Rather,	   it	   raises	   several	   issues	  
among	  which	   flood	   risks	   can	  be	  a	  major	   concern	  with	   such	  open-­‐sky	  channels.	  This	   risk	   is,	   indeed,	  
intensified	   in	   two	   ways:	   the	   growing	   number	   of	   tourists	   and	   dangerous	   behaviours	   (depredation,	  
obstruction)	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  such	  events,	  while	  the	  multiplication	  of	  habitations	  alongside	  
bisses	  amplifies	  potential	  consequences.	   In	  2012	  for	   instance,	  an	  overflow	  caused	  by	  several	   inten-­‐
tional	  obstructions	  of	  the	  bisse	  Vieux	   (one	  of	  the	  main	  bisses	  of	  the	  Municipality),	  although	  rapidly	  
contained,	  could	  have	  caused	  major	  damages.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  main	  concerns	  regard	  both	  preven-­‐
tion	  (appropriate	  maintenance,	  control	  of	  behaviours)	  and	  reparation	  (civil	  liability).	  
Built	  and	  (historically	  at	  least)	  managed	  by	  local	  user	  groups	  (consortages)4,	  bisses	  are	  characterized	  
by	   self-­‐organized	   modes	   of	   governance	   whose	   continuity	   has	   been	   guaranteed	   by	   the	   Swiss	   Civil	  
Code	   (art.59	   al.3).	   Although	   few	   provisions	   directly	   concern	   irrigation,	   public	   policies	   designed	   to	  
address	  water	  or	  other	  related	  questions	  also	  have	  an	   indirect	  effect	   (Schweizer	  &	  Knoepfel	  2013),	  
not	  without	  provoking	  contradictions	  with	   the	   traditional	  community	   regulation.	   In	   that	   sense,	   the	  
institutional	  regime	  must	  be	  considered	  as	  complex.	  As	  for	  civil	  liability,	  the	  Swiss	  Code	  of	  Obligations	  
states	  that	  the	  “owner	  of	  a	  building	  or	  any	  other	  structure	  is	  liable	  for	  any	  damage	  caused	  by	  defects	  
in	  its	  construction	  or	  design	  or	  by	  inadequate	  maintenance”	  (art.58	  CO).	  A	  1973	  cantonal	  judgement	  
confirmed	  that	  bisses	  must	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  “structure”	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  this	  article,	  and	  that	  con-­‐
sortages	  shouldered	  the	  related	  liability	  (RVJ	  1973	  326).	  In	  this	  context,	  consortages	  executive	  bodies	  
(comity)	  appear	  to	  be	  in	  a	  tricky	  situation	  in	  case	  of	  flood	  events	  because	  of	  the	  potentially	  high	  fi-­‐
nancial	  costs	  of	  civil	  reparation.	  
2.	  Social	  interaction	  process:	  actors’	  network,	  policy	  resources,	  interests	  and	  strategies	  
Since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s,	  the	  Consortage	  of	  the	  Bisse	  Vieux	  (CBV)	  has	  been	  particularly	  active	  
in	  putting	  risks	  and	  liability	  issues	  on	  the	  agenda.	  Alone	  or	  in	  coalition	  with	  other	  consortages,	  it	  ob-­‐
tained	   evolutions	   of	   the	   regulatory	   arrangement	   towards	  more	   polycentric	   governance	   structures.	  
Although	  the	  role	  of	  traditional	  consortages	  remained	  significant,	  some	  tasks	  related	  to	  maintenance	  
and	   exploitation	   have	   progressively	   been	   transferred	   to	   other	   local	   actors	   (Municipality,	   Tourism	  
office),	  while	  cantonal	  entities	  also	  started	  to	  play	  a	  more	  important	  role.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  actors’	  
networks	  can	  thus	  be	  described	  as	  strongly	  open	  and	  horizontally	  coordinated.	  	  
In	   recent	   years,	   the	   regulatory	   arrangement	  was	   perceived	   as	   unsatisfying	   by	   the	   CBV,	   who	   once	  
again	   pressured	   to	   obtain	   some	   evolutions.	  More	   concretely,	   it	  made	   a	   double	   request	   in	   August	  
2010:	   to	  give	   consortage	   leaders	   the	  possibility	   to	   impose	   fines	   in	  order	   to	   improve	   the	   control	  of	  
behaviours	  (‘fines	  request’);	  and	  to	  conclude	  a	  bilateral	  agreement	  with	  the	  commune	  regarding	  civil	  
liability,	   towards	   a	   form	  of	   shared	   liability	   (‘civil	   liability	   request’).	   The	   fear	   of	   the	   financial	   conse-­‐
quences	  of	  an	  overflow	  (in	  relation	  to	  the	  civil	  liability	  of	  art.58	  CO)	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  most	  important	  
                                                
3	  The	  detailed	  Nendaz	  case	  study	  is	  published	  (Schweizer	  2012)	  and	  available	  online.	  
4	  They	  provide	  interesting	  examples	  of	  common-­‐pool	  resources	  (CPR)	  governance	  (Ostrom	  1990).	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driver	  behind	  this	  strategy.	  The	  interest	  is	  thus	  both	  self-­‐centred	  and	  substantive	  (the	  goal	  is	  to	  ob-­‐
tain	  concrete	  impacts	  in	  the	  ‘real’	  world).	  
In	  a	  first	  step,	  the	  CBV	  did	  not	  get	  any	  concessions.	  Isolated	  in	  the	  actors’	  network,	  unable	  (or	  more	  
precisely	  uninterested)	  to	  initiate	  a	  coalition,	  and	  facing	  a	  strategy	  of	  total	  passivity	  from	  the	  Munici-­‐
pality,	  it	  was	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  negotiate;	  its	  bargaining	  efforts	  clearly	  appeared	  unsuccessful.	  It	  is	  
only	  after	  the	  flood	  event	  of	  2012	  that	  things	  began	  to	  take	  off:	  the	  consortage	  decided	  to	  alert	  the	  
media,	  and	  to	  cut	  off	  water	  (mobilization	  of	  policy	  resources	  force,	  infrastructure	  and	  information).	  
In	  this	  second	  step,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relations	  clearly	  moved	  towards	  confrontation.	   If	  no	  compro-­‐
mises	  were	  reached	  regarding	  the	  ‘fines	  request’	  –	  local	  authorities	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  such	  a	  possibil-­‐
ity	  would	  not	  be	  granted	  to	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  the	  Municipality	  accepted	  to	  take	  over	  civil	  liability	  until	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  irrigation	  season,	  and	  to	  reach	  a	  more	  perennial	  solution	  for	  2013.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  
the	  2013	  irrigation	  season	  however,	  even	  though	  the	  temporary	  agreement	  has	  expired	  and	  despite	  
the	  Municipality	  commitment,	  no	  long-­‐term	  solution	  has	  been	  reached5.	  	  
3.	  Results:	  outputs,	  impacts	  and	  feedback	  loops	  
The	  process	  described	  above	  represents	  a	  case	  of	  partial	  success	  for	  the	  innovation	  strategy.	  Regard-­‐
ing	  the	  three	  indicators	  identified,	  the	  results	  are	  the	  followings:	  -­‐ outputs	  (partly):	  the	  outputs	  of	  the	  process	  take	  the	  form	  of	  both	  a	  temporary	  arrangement	  
(agreement	  regarding	  civil	  liability	  limited	  to	  the	  2012	  season)	  and	  a	  series	  of	  ‘non-­‐decisions’:	  
no	  decision	  related	  to	  the	  ‘fines	  request’;	  and	  no	  perennial	  decision	  related	  to	  the	  ‘civil	  liabil-­‐
ity	  request’.	  Hence	  the	  CBV	  was	  able	  to	  modify	  the	  regulatory	  arrangement	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  
only	  partially	  congruent	  with	  its	  initial	  strategy.	  -­‐ impacts	  (partly):	  in	  the	  same	  vein,	  the	  impacts	  on	  actors’	  behaviour	  are	  only	  partial:	  inexist-­‐
ent	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   ‘fines	   request’	   (consortage	  members	  cannot	   impose	   fines);	   limited	   to	  
2012	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  ‘civil	  liability	  request’	  (the	  consortage	  is	  liable	  again	  for	  year	  2013).	  
In	  that	  sense,	  the	  aforementioned	  regulatory	  arrangement	  does	  not	  resolve	  the	  ‘civil	  liability	  
issues’	  on	  the	  long	  term	  (at	  least	  not	  for	  the	  moment).	  -­‐ feedbacks	  (none):	  the	  analysis	  shows	  no	  modification	  of	  the	  institutional	  regime.	  It	  is	  howev-­‐
er	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  such	  a	  generalization	  never	  was	  an	  objective	  of	  the	  CBV.	  The	  prob-­‐
lem	  was	  constructed	  as	  a	  local	  one,	  and	  was	  never	  taken	  to	  cantonal	  or	  national	  arenas.	  The	  
CBV	  clearly	  did	  not	  seek	  an	  institutionalization	  of	  the	  proposed	  solutions	  (modification	  of	  the	  
rules	  of	  the	  game),	  but	  only	  an	  implementation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  bisse	  Vieux	  (modification	  
limited,	  so	  to	  say,	  to	  one	  specific	  game).	  
4.	  Conclusion:	  explanatory	  factors	  of	  the	  results	  
From	  an	  apparently	  unfavourable	  initial	  situation	  (clear	  provision	  regarding	  civil	  liability	  in	  the	  institu-­‐
tional	  regime,	  isolated	  position	  in	  the	  actors’	  network,	  incapacity	  to	  initiate	  a	  coalition	  or	  to	  engage	  
in	  bargaining	  interactions),	  the	  CBV	  nevertheless	  managed	  to	  obtain	  some	  outputs	  and	  impacts	  par-­‐
tially	  congruent	  with	   its	   strategy.	  The	  pivotal	  elements	  here	  seem	  to	  be	   the	  conjunction	  of	  a	  case-­‐
specific	  event	  (the	  flood	  of	  2012)	  and	  a	  capacity	  to	  mobilize	  and	  combine	  its	  policy	  resources	  at	  the	  
right	   time:	   information	   (alert	   of	   the	  media);	   infrastructure	   and	   force	   (shutting-­‐down	   of	   the	   water	  
supply);	  and	  time	  (good	  timing:	  just	  after	  the	  flood	  event	  and	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  irrigation	  season).	  
It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that,	   in	   that	   respect,	   the	   temporary	   agreement	   of	   2012	  was	   not	   obtained	  
through	  cooperation	   (collaboration,	  mutual	   trust)	  or	  bargaining	   (exchange	  of	  policy	   resources),	  but	  
rather	   through	  more	  conflictual	   relations;	   it	  was	  only	  when	  clearly	  challenged	  and	  confronted	   that	  
the	  Municipality	  consented	  to	  some	  compromises.	  
                                                
5	  Situation	  in	  May	  2013.	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Case	  3:	  disposal	  site	  in	  Bonfol	  (Switzerland)	  6	  
1.	  Inputs:	  embedded	  layers	  of	  context	  
Even	  in	  Switzerland,	  a	  most	  developed	  liberal	  democracy	  often	  praised	  for	  its	  environmental	  records,	  
public	   regulations	   concerning	   the	   management	   of	   industrial	   waste	   remained	   particularly	   lacunar	  
throughout	  most	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  The	  responsibility	  for	  the	  storage	  and	  elimination	  of	  industrial	  
waste	   frequently	  provoked	  disputes	  between	  firms	  and	  public	  authorities,	  and	   fly-­‐tipping	  was	  rela-­‐
tively	   common.	   The	   situation	   changed	  when	   the	   national	   authorities	   enacted	   the	   first	   law	   on	   the	  
protection	  of	  the	  environment	  in	  1983,	  which	  clearly	  attributed	  the	  responsibility	  to	  eliminate	  waste	  
in	  an	  innocuous	  way	  to	  its	  producer.	  However,	  this	  paradigmatic	  shift	  emerged	  too	  late	  to	  avoid	  the	  
pollution	  of	  the	  soil	  and	  water	  of	  about	  50’000	  sites	  because	  of	  the	  anarchic	  deposit	  of	  industrial	  and	  
–	  sometimes	  –	  household	  waste	  into	  the	  ground.	  	  
After	  the	  definitive	  prohibition	  of	  toxic	  waste	  storage	   in	  the	  ground	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s’,	  
the	  national	  authorities	  drafted	  a	  new	  ordinance	  on	  the	  remediation	  of	  contaminated	  sites	  in	  1998,	  
which	  commanded	  to	  secure	  and	  decontaminate	  the	  most	  polluted	  areas.	  This	  new	  institutional	  con-­‐
text	  must	  be	  considered	  as	  “strong”,	  since	  most	  of	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  dumpsites	  would	  now	  come	  
under	  the	  rule	  of	  coherent	  regulations.	  However,	  the	  exact	  modalities	  and	  objectives	  of	  remediation	  
were	  purposely	  left	  open,	  implying	  negotiations	  during	  an	  implementation	  phase	  initially	  character-­‐
ized	   by	   neo-­‐corporatist	   types	   of	   actors’	   networks	   (quasi-­‐horizontal	   coordination	   between	   a	   few	  
number	  of	  private	  firms	  and	  the	  sub-­‐national	  administration).	  
It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  in	  1998,	  the	  comparatively	  small	  and	  low	  developed	  canton	  of	  Jura	  (nearby	  
the	  French	  border)	  requested	  a	  consortium	  of	  famous	  chemical	  multinationals7	  to	  fully	  remediate	  a	  
site	  near	  the	  small	  village	  of	  Bonfol.	  This	  site	  had	  been	  contaminated	  by	  an	   industrial	   landfill	  –	  the	  
second	  biggest	  of	  this	  type	  in	  Switzerland	  –	  which	  had	  been	  used	  by	  the	  chemical	  multinationals	  to	  
store	  various	  sorts	  and	  arts	  of	  toxic	  chemical	  waste	  including	  dangerous	  dioxins.	  
2.	  Social	  interaction	  process:	  actors’	  network,	  policy	  resources,	  interests	  and	  strategies	  
Unsurprisingly,	  the	  request	  met	  a	  frontal	  resistance	  of	  the	  firms,	  which	  had	  developed	  a	  sophisticat-­‐
ed	  rhetoric	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  Bonfol	  site	  was	  in	  reality	  already	  conform	  to	  the	  law	  and	  that	  full	  re-­‐
mediation	   was	   unnecessary.	   Conflicting	   negotiations	   between	   public	   authorities	   and	   the	   chemical	  
multinationals	   had	   been	   going	   on	   for	   almost	   two	   years	   when	   Greenpeace	   occupied	   the	   site	   and	  
launched	  an	  impressive	  shock	  campaign	  involving	  more	  than	  100	  volunteers	  dressed	  in	  bacteriologi-­‐
cal	  suits	  and	  gas	  masks.	  This	  episode	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  environmental	  
controversies	  in	  Switzerland.	  
The	   public	   pressure	   became	   such	   that	   the	  multinational	   companies	   backed	   down	   in	   2000	   and	   ac-­‐
cepted	   to	   remediate	   the	   site.	  Greenpeace,	   now	   regrouped	  within	   a	   collective	  of	  NGOs,	  were	   inte-­‐
grated	   in	   the	  process	   through	   the	   creation	  of	   a	   deliberative	   and	  opened	  platform	   including	  public	  
authorities	  from	  all	  levels	  of	  governance,	  as	  well	  as	  private	  companies.	  Sub-­‐national	  state	  authorities	  
had	  the	  formal	  authority	  to	  steer	  the	  process.	  However,	  its	  lack	  of	  information	  and	  technical	  exper-­‐
tise	  resulted	  in	  a	  de	  facto	  dependency	  and	  horizontality	  of	  state	  coordination	  mechanisms	  with	  firms	  
and	  NGOs.	  The	  NGOs	  used	  this	  actors’	  network	  structure	  to	  push	  for	  higher	  environmental	  integrity	  
in	  the	  remediation	  process,	  and	  tried	  to	  make	  a	  case	  out	  of	  this	  as	  to	  enshrine	  stronger	  environmen-­‐
tal	  standards	  in	  formal	  regulations.	  Through	  their	  technical	  expertise,	  the	  NGOs	  manage	  to	  point	  out	  
several	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  approach	  championed	  by	  the	  multinationals	  in	  the	  first	  remediation	  plan	  
proposed	  in	  2003.	  They	  raised	  awareness	  around	  the	  gaps	  in	  the	  remediation	  plan,	  pushing	  the	  sub-­‐
national	  authorities	  to	  request	  numerous	  revisions.	  
                                                
6	  The	  detailed	  Bonfol	  case	  study	  is	  published	  (Dupuis	  &	  Knoepfel	  2013)	  and	  available	  online.	  
7	  Including	  BASF	  Schweiz	  AG,	  Clariant,	  Novartis,	  Syngenta,	  Roche,	  Rohner,	  CABB	  AG	  and	  Henkel.	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The	  relations	  between	  public	  authorities	  and	  NGOs	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  chemical	  multinationals	  on	  
the	   other	   hand	   were	   conflicting.	   They	   involved	   disputes	   over	   the	   environmental	   objectives	   to	   be	  
achieved	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  remediation,	  in	  relation	  to	  which	  the	  firms	  requested	  a	  public	  participa-­‐
tion.	  Craftily,	  the	  firms	  managed	  to	  bypass	  the	  deliberative	  platform	  in	  which	  the	  NGOs	  had	  gained	  
influence.	  They	  concluded	  a	  new	  exclusive	  agreement	  with	  the	  sub-­‐national	  authorities,	  stating	  that	  
future	  decisions	   regarding	   the	  remediation	  would	  have	  to	  be	   taken	  behind	  closed	  doors,	  excluding	  
NGOs,	  in	  exchange	  of	  the	  firms’	  guarantee	  to	  assume	  the	  full	  costs	  of	  remediation.	  
This	  new	  agreement	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  coalition	  between	  chemical	  multina-­‐
tionals	  and	  sub-­‐national	  authorities,	  who	  shared	  a	  common	  interest	   in	  realizing	  the	  remediation	  as	  
quickly	  as	  possible	  and	  complying	  minimally	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	   the	   institutional	   regime.	  The	  
NGOs,	  although	  deprived	  from	  their	  main	  canal	  of	  influence	  on	  the	  decision	  process,	  did	  not	  give	  up	  
and	  tried	  to	  realize	  their	  strategy	  of	  enhancing	  the	  environmental	  integrity	  by	  other	  ways.	  Showing	  a	  
remarkable	   ingenuity,	   they	  rented	  a	   land	  nearby	  the	  site	  of	  Bonfol	  and	  used	  the	  right	  of	  appeal	  as	  
conferred	  to	  neighbors	  against	  the	  spatial	  planning	  procedures	  implied	  by	  the	  remediation.	  The	  case	  
was	  heard	  by	  an	  administrative	  court	  and,	  following	  lengthy	  discussions,	  the	  chemical	  firms	  ultimate-­‐
ly	  conceded	  to	  most	  of	  the	  NGOs	  demands.	  
3.	  Results:	  outputs,	  impacts	  and	  feedback	  loops	  
We	  consider	  the	  results	  of	  the	  described	  process	  as	  a	  successful	  innovation	  strategy	  in	  reference	  to	  
our	  indicators	  (outputs	  –	  impacts	  –	  feedbacks	  on	  the	  institutional	  regime).	  -­‐ Outputs	  (yes):	  the	  coalition	  of	  NGOs	  manages	  to	  shape	  a	  regulatory	  arrangement	  that	  goes	  
beyond	   the	  environmental	  protection	   standards	  of	   the	   institutional	   regime.	  Their	  demands	  
were	   more	   precisely	   materialized	   by	   a	   judgment	   that	   includes	   provisions	   related	   to	   a	  
strengthening	   of	   the	   remediation	   techniques;	   more	   transparency	   in	   the	   monitoring	   and	  
communication	  related	  to	  the	  state	  of	  the	  environment	  during	  the	  remediation;	  and	  the	  con-­‐
sultation	  of	  NGOs	  for	  any	  further	  and	  significant	  requirements.	  	  -­‐ Impacts	   (yes):	  the	  decision	  obtained	  by	  the	  NGOs	  had	  clear	   impacts	  on	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  
actors	  involved	  in	  the	  remediation.	  All	  activities,	  monitoring	  and	  evaluation	  reports	  produced	  
since	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	   concrete	   remediation	  process	   in	  2009	   indeed	  demonstrate	   con-­‐
gruent	  impacts	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  compliant	  behavior	  of	  the	  chemical	  companies.	  -­‐ Feedbacks	  (no):	  the	  judgment	  pronounced	  by	  the	  court	  did	  not	  result	  in	  a	  modification	  of	  the	  
institutional	  regime	  and	  the	  action	  of	  the	  NGOs	  pertains	  to	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  Bonfol.	  This	  is	  
due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  right	  to	  appeal	  of	  NGOs	  in	  this	  case	  concerned	  the	  revision	  of	  a	  single	  
local	  level	  spatial	  planning	  procedure,	  which	  is	  not	  related	  to	  the	  higher-­‐level	  institutional	  re-­‐
gime	  of	  contaminated	  sites.	  
4.	  Conclusion:	  explanatory	  factors	  of	  the	  results	  
The	  relative	  success	  of	  the	  NGOs’	  strategy	  in	  producing	  outputs	  and	  impacts	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  
conjunction	  of	  several	  mechanisms.	  First,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  institutional	  regime	  did	  not	  define	  strictly	  
goals	  and	  techniques	  of	  remediation	  trigger	  the	  perception	  of	  NGOs	  that	  the	  prescriptions	  on	  envi-­‐
ronmental	  integrity	  should	  be	  strengthened.	  Second,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  actors’	  network	  combined	  
with	  the	  repartition	  of	  policy	  resources	  appeared	  essential	  to	  understand	  the	  success	  of	  the	  innova-­‐
tion	  strategy.	  NGOs	  disposed	  and	  mobilized	  resources	  in	  terms	  of	  organization	  and	  force	  as	  to	  occupy	  
the	  site	  of	  Bonfol	  and	  employed	  the	  wide	  popular	  support	  related	  to	  this	  action	  to	  request	  the	  net-­‐
work	  to	  open.	  The	  skewed	  repartition	  of	  information	  and	  expertise	  on	  remediation	  techniques	  creat-­‐
ed	  horizontality	  in	  the	  coordination	  and	  allowed	  the	  NGOs	  to	  weight	  on	  the	  decision	  process.	  Finally,	  
after	  their	  exclusion	  from	  the	  actors’	  network,	  NGOs	  manage	  to	  obtain	  what	  they	  wanted	  by	  using	  in	  
their	  favor	  the	  law,	  which	  stemmed	  from	  the	  acquisition	  of	  land	  (infrastructure).  
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Results comparison and discussion 
The	  presented	  cases	  provided	  in-­‐depth	  empirical	  accounts	  of	  the	  social	  interaction	  processes	  related	  
to	  three	  strategies	  of	   innovative	   implementation:	  from	  a	  coalition	  of	  NGOs	  in	  Lombok	  (PES	  scheme	  
implementation);	   from	  an	   individual	  non-­‐state	  actor	   in	  Nendaz	   (requests	   related	   to	   the	  prevention	  
and	  reparation	  of	  flood	  risks);	  and	  from	  another	  coalition	  of	  NGOs	  in	  Bonfol	  (enshrinement	  of	  higher	  
environmental	  standards	  for	  remediation	  processes).	   In	  this	  comparison	  and	  discussion	  section,	  we	  
come	   back	   to	   the	   degree	   of	   success	   of	   these	   attempts	   of	   innovation,	   before	   identifying	   empirical	  
regularities	  in	  the	  individual	  pathways	  that	  led	  to	  these	  results.	  
Degree	  of	  success	  of	  the	  innovation	  strategies	  
Table	  2	  summarizes,	  based	  on	  the	  three	  levels	   identified	  to	  qualify	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  the	  de-­‐
gree	  of	  success	  of	  the	  innovation	  strategies	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  actors	  pursuing	  it:	  
Table	  2:	  comparison	  of	  the	  degrees	  of	  success	  of	  the	  innovation	  strategies	  
	   Outputs	  (modification	  of	  the	  
regulatory	  arrangement)	  
Impacts	  (modification	  of	  the	  
actors’	  behavior)	  
Feedbacks	  (modification	  of	  
the	  institutional	  regime)	  
Lombok	   Yes	   No	  (but	  secondary	  objective)	   Yes	  (in	  a	  second	  phase)	  
Nendaz	   Partly	   Partly	   No	  (but	  not	  targeted)	  
Bonfol	   Yes	   Yes	   No	  (but	  secondary	  objective)	  
As	  illustrated	  in	  table	  2,	  the	  innovation	  strategies	  met,	  from	  an	  actor-­‐based	  perspective,	  with	  various	  
degrees	  of	  success.	  If	  no	  case	  demonstrates	  full	  congruence	  (three	  ‘yes’),	  the	  strategy	  appears	  to	  be	  
quasi-­‐successful	  in	  two	  cases:	  Lombok	  and	  Bonfol.	  Indeed,	  the	  coalitions	  involved	  in	  these	  cases	  ob-­‐
tained	  results	  (and	  in	  particular	  outputs)	  congruent	  with	  their	  strategies.	  The	  two	  levels	  for	  which	  the	  
evaluation	   is	  negative	  appeared	   in	   fact	  secondary	   in	   their	  perspective:	   surprisingly,	   the	  coalition	  of	  
NGOs	  did	  not	  mainly	   focus	  on	  effectively	   changing	  actors’	  behaviors	   in	   Lombok	   (impacts	  were	  not	  
dominant);	  and,	  because	  of	  an	  anticipation	  of	  the	  difficulties	  to	  modify	  the	  institutional	  regime,	  the	  
main	  objectives	  were	  case-­‐specific	  in	  Bonfol	  (feedbacks	  were	  not	  dominant).	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  
of	  the	  coalitions,	  the	  results	  are	  thus	  congruent	  with	  their	  main	  goals;	  that	  is	  why	  we	  are	  talking	  of	  
quasi-­‐success.	  Following	  the	  same	  reasoning,	  the	  success	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Nendaz	  must	  be	  considered	  
as	  only	  partial:	  the	  consortage	  obtained	  only	  mitigated	  results	  on	  the	  two	  levels	  it	  targeted.	  
More	   generally,	   our	   fieldwork	   illustrates	  how	   field	   actors	   do	  not	   necessarily	   aim	   to	   succeed	  on	   all	  
three	  levels.	  If	  feedback	  loops	  on	  institutional	  regimes	  can	  be	  part	  of	  the	  strategy,	  leading,	  if	  success-­‐
ful,	  to	  cases	  where	  concrete	  action	  precedes	  policy	  (Barrett	  &	  Hill	  1984),	  this	  is	  not	  systematically	  the	  
case:	   the	   strategy	  was	   clearly	   case-­‐specific	   in	   Nendaz,	   and	   feedbacks	   only	   secondary	   in	   Bonfol;	   in	  
Lombok,	   feedback	   loops	  were	  obtained	  without	  being	   initially	  part	  of	   the	  strategy.	   In	  other	  words,	  
field	  actors	  do	  not	  necessarily	  seek	  an	  institutionalization	  of	  their	  strategy	  (modification	  of	  the	  rules	  
of	  the	  game),	  but	  sometimes	  only	  pursue	  case-­‐specific	  interests	  (modification	  limited	  to	  one	  specific	  
game).	  In	  fact,	  if	  modifications	  of	  the	  institutional	  regime	  through	  feedbacks	  surely	  are	  attractive,	  in	  
the	  sense	  that	  they	  set	  in	  stone	  a	  given	  innovation	  and	  ensure	  its	  transfer	  to	  other	  cases,	  they	  can	  be	  
very	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  (in	  terms	  of	  policy	  resources,	  etc.).	  
More	   surprisingly,	   if	  we	  move	   from	   an	   actor-­‐	   to	   a	   problem-­‐based	   perspective,	   our	   cases	   highlight	  
how	  innovative	  and	  creative	  strategies	  are	  not	  necessarily	  positive	  in	  terms	  of	  environmental	  integri-­‐
ty.	  Actors	  –	  even	  beneficiaries	  such	  as	  NGOs	  –	  pursue	  their	  own	  interests,	  which	  do	  not	  only	  aim	  at	  
improving	  the	  ‘environment’:	  here	  they	  want	  to	  stabilize	  their	  position	  in	  the	  actors’	  network	  (Lom-­‐
bok,	   Bonfol),	   there	   their	   interests	   are	  mainly	   financial	   (Nendaz).	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Lombok,	   we	   even	  
show	  that	  substantive	  stakes	  in	  terms	  of	  impacts	  were	  relegated	  after	  institutional	  issues.	  The	  posi-­‐
tive	  gap	  we	  expected	  may	  thus	  in	  fact	  be	  neutral,	  or	  even	  negative	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  problem	  solving.	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Regularities	  in	  the	  individual	  pathways	  
Innovation	  strategies	  emerged,	  and	  (partially)	  succeeded,	   independently	  of	  the	  type	  of	   institutional	  
regime,	   i.e.	  even	   in	   strong	   (Bonfol)	  or	   complex	   (Nendaz)	  ones.	  On	  a	   closer	   look	  however,	   it	   seems	  
that	   innovative	   implementation	   is	   probably	   facing	   fewer	   obstacles	   in	   weak	   institutional	   regimes	  
(Lombok)	  or	  when	  it	  targets	  elements	  that	  are	  not	  explicitly	  regulated	  in	  strong	  or	  complex	  regimes	  
(Bonfol,	  where	  the	  modalities	  and	  objectives	  of	  remediation	  were	  purposely	  left	  open).	  On	  the	  con-­‐
trary,	  innovation	  appears	  more	  difficult	  where	  a	  clear	  rule	  exists	  (civil	  liability	  in	  Nendaz).	  	  
If	  institutions	  certainly	  matter	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  our	  cases	  nevertheless	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  (par-­‐
tially)	   successful	   “innovative	   implementation”	   strategies	   resulted	   from	  complex	  processes	   in	  which	  
various	   variables	   and	  mechanisms	   interacted.	  Without	   denying	   the	   diversity	   of	   each	   case,	   table	   3	  
identifies	  regularities	   in	  the	  pathways	  specific	  to	  each	  case:	  a	  contextual	  change	  or	  event	  (input);	  a	  
capacity	  for	  the	  actors	  to	  surf	  the	  wave	  (process);	  and	  a	  certain	  result.	  
Table	  3:	  regularities	  in	  the	  individual	  pathways	  
	   Lombok	   Nendaz	   Bonfol	  
1.	  Inputs	  
Contextual	  
change	  or	  event	  	  
-­‐ general	  trend	  towards	  PES	  
(change	  in	  wider	  context)	  
-­‐ overflow	  in	  2012	  (case-­‐
specific	  event)	  
-­‐ enactment	  of	  the	  ordinance	  
on	  the	  remediation	  of	  con-­‐
taminated	  sites	  in	  1998	  
(change	  in	  the	  institutional	  
regime)	  
2.	  Process	  
Capacity	  to	  surf	  
the	  ‘wave’	  
-­‐ creativity	  in	  the	  mobiliza-­‐
tion/combination	  of	  policy	  
resources:	  information;	  con-­‐
sensus;	  organization	  -­‐ presence	  of	  a	  coalition	  in	  an	  
actors’	  network	  character-­‐
ized	  by	  a	  strong	  openness;	  
heterarchical	  coordination;	  
and	  cooperative	  relations.	  	  
-­‐ creativity	  in	  the	  mobiliza-­‐
tion/combination	  of	  policy	  
resources:	  information,	  infra-­‐
structure,	  force,	  time	  -­‐ absence	  of	  coalition	  in	  an	  
actors’	  network	  characterized	  
by	  a	  strong	  openness;	  heter-­‐
archical	  coordination;	  and	  
non-­‐cooperative	  relations.	  	  
-­‐ creativity	  in	  the	  mobiliza-­‐
tion/combination	  of	  policy	  
resources:	  information,	  force,	  
organization,	  public	  support,	  
law	  -­‐ presence	  of	  a	  coalition	  in	  	  an	  
actors’	  network	  characterized	  
by	  a	  strong	  openness;	  heter-­‐
archical	  coordination;	  and	  
non-­‐cooperative	  relations.	  	  
3.	  Results	   Quasi-­‐success	   Partial	  success	   Quasi-­‐success	  
In	  all	   three	   cases,	   the	   innovation	   strategies	   can	  be	   related	   to	   contextual	   changes	  or	  events	   (i.e.	   to	  
changes	   in	  the	  inputs	  of	  figure	  1):	  to	  an	  international	  trend	  promoting	  specific	  market-­‐based	  policy	  
instrument	   (PES)	   in	   the	   case	  of	   Lombok	   (change	   in	   the	  wider	   context);	   to	   a	  new	  ordinance	  on	   the	  
remediation	   of	   contaminated	   sites	   in	   Bonfol	   (change	   in	   the	   broad	   institutional	   context);	   and	   to	   a	  
flood	  event	  in	  Nendaz	  (case-­‐specific	  event).	  The	  latter	  is	  particularly	  illustrative	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  
‘contextual’	  elements,	  since	  it	  is	  only	  after	  the	  flood	  that	  the	  Municipality	  agreed,	  at	  least	  partially,	  to	  
compromise;	   clearly	   this	  element	  acted	  as	  a	   turning	  point.	  More	  broadly,	   these	  observations	  high-­‐
light	  the	  pertinence	  of	  the	  three	  identified	  layers	  of	  context,	  and	  of	  their	  conceptualization	  as	  a	  set	  of	  
constraints	   of	   opportunities.	   The	   context	   clearly	   constraints	   the	   choice	   and	  behavior	   of	   the	   actors	  
engaged	  in	  social	  interaction	  processes,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  grant	  them	  opportunities	  to	  engage	  and	  suc-­‐
ceed	   in	   innovation	   strategies.	   This	   specific	   point	   echoes	   the	   work	   by	   Laesslé	   et	   al.	   (2013),	   who	  
showed	   that	  non-­‐state	  actors	   in	   Swiss	   rural	   areas	   could	   sometimes	   take	  advantage	  of	   institutional	  
changes	  or	  exogenous	  ‘shocks’	  to	  obtain	  favorable	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  regulatory	  arrangement.	  
However,	  a	  contextual	  change	  does	  not	   in	   itself	  explain	  the	  success	  of	  a	  strategy.	  The	  ability	  of	  the	  
innovating	   (coalition	  of)	  actors	   to	  “surf	   the	  wave”	  seems	  even	  more	   important.	  The	   timing	   issue	   is	  
evident	  here,	  with	  a	  necessity	  to	  seize	  the	  opportunity	  when	  it	  arises.	  This	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  capacity	  of	  
actors	  to	  mobilize/generate/substitute/manage/combine	  the	  right	  policy	  resource	  at	  the	  right	  time.	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In	  that	  respect,	  our	  cases	  showed	  a	  strong	  strategic	  creativity	   from	  field	  actors.	  The	  decisive	  policy	  
resources	  are,	  in	  this	  context,	  not	  necessarily	  the	  ones	  that	  could	  have	  been	  expected	  (money,	  law),	  
and	  the	  apparently	  “stronger”	  actors	  not	  always	  the	  winners.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  field	  actors	  proved	  to	  
be	  particularly	   ingenious,	  mobilizing	  and	  combining	  policy	  resource	  such	  as	   information,	   force,	  and	  
infrastructure	   (Nendaz),	   organization,	   consensus,	   and	   information	   (Lombok),	   or	   information,	   force,	  
organization,	  public	  support,	  and	  law	  (Bonfol).	  	  
Another	   important	  element	   in	  that	  respect	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  a	  coalition	  of	  
actors:	  the	  two	  cases	  where	  the	  innovation	  strategies	  were	  taken	  forward	  by	  a	  coalition	  (Lombok	  and	  
Bonfol)	  proved	  to	  be	  more	  successful	  than	  the	  one	  where	  the	   innovating	  actor	  acted	  alone	  (partial	  
success	  in	  Nendaz).	  Indeed,	  in	  actors’	  network	  characterised	  by	  strong	  degrees	  of	  openness,	  heterar-­‐
chical	  types	  of	  coordination,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  cooperative	  relations,	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  power	  is	  
often	  high.	   In	   this	  context,	   the	  ability	   to	   form	  a	  coalition	  around	  specific	   interests,	  and	  to	   federate	  
these	  interests	  around	  a	  common	  strategy,	  seems	  to	  be	  crucial	   in	  explaining	  the	  capacity	  of	  certain	  
actors	  to	  impose	  the	  strategy	  in	  question.	  	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  actors’	  networks	  as	  such,	  even	  when	  close	  to	  the	  ideal	  of	  deliberation	  and	  par-­‐
ticipation	  advocated	  by	  much	  of	  the	  governance(s)	  scholars,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  yield	  much	  explanato-­‐
ry	  power	  without	   the	  explicit	  account	  of	  actors’	   resources,	   interests,	  and	  coalitions.	   If	   it	   can	  be	  ar-­‐
gued	  that	  open	  networks	  enable	  the	  capacity	  to	  influence	  regulatory	  arrangement,	  analyses	  limited	  
to	  the	  structure	  of	  actors’	  networks	  are	  insufficient	  to	  explain	  when	  and	  why	  certain	  coalitions	  might	  
come	  out	  as	  winners	  of	  social	   interaction	  processes.	  The	  conjunction	  of	  the	  network	  structure,	  the	  
actors’	  policy	   resources	  endowment,	  and	   their	   specific	   interests	  certainly	  gives	  a	  better	  account	  of	  
the	   reality.	   The	   positive	   assumptions	   sometime	   associated	   to	   collaborative	  modes	   of	   coordination	  
(Bäckstrand	  et	  al.	  2010)	  or	  neo-­‐corporatist	  countries	  (Scruggs	  2001)	  in	  terms	  of	  environmental	  integ-­‐
rity	  appear	  in	  that	  sense	  simplistic:	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bonfol	  and	  Nendaz	  for	  instance,	  non-­‐collaborative	  
coordination	  and	  the	  use	  of	  force	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  led	  to	  outputs	  that	  strengthen	  (at	  least	  partial-­‐
ly)	  regulations	  related	  to	  the	  environment.	   
Conclusion 
The	  broad	  aim	  of	  this	  contribution	  was	  to	  conceptually	  and	  empirically	  explore	  phenomena	  of	  inno-­‐
vation	  in	  action	  –	  or	  “innovative	  implementation”	  –	  in	  environment-­‐related	  areas,	  and	  to	  propose	  a	  
framework	   to	   assess	   whether	   and	   under	   which	   conditions	   they	   could	   be	   successful.	   Defined	   as	   a	  
strategy	  by	  which	  (coalitions	  of)	  actors	  seek	  to	  develop	  tailor-­‐made	  solutions	  to	  address	  environmen-­‐
tal	   issues,	   endeavors	   of	   innovative	   implementation	  were	   investigated	   through	   three	   in-­‐depth	   case	  
studies.	  Overall,	  our	  results	  highlighted	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  “social	   interaction	  processes”	  related	  
to	  innovation,	  within	  which	  a	  broad	  variety	  of	  interdependent	  exogenous	  and	  endogenous	  variables	  
interact	  (exogenous	  changes	  or	  events,	  actors’	  networks	  structure,	  endowment	   in	  policy	  resources,	  
interests	   and	   strategies,	   presence	   or	   absence	   of	   coalitions).	   Hence,	   adopting	   a	   multifactorial	   ap-­‐
proach	   proved	   to	   be	   necessary	   to	   explain	   phenomena	   of	   innovation,	   speaking	   in	   favour	   of	   frame-­‐
works	  such	  as	  the	  one	  proposed	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  
In	  this	  context,	  the	  in-­‐depth	  knowledge	  generated	  by	  the	  carefully	  documented	  case	  studies	  proved	  
to	  be	  crucial	  to	  account	  for	  these	  complex	  processes,	  demonstrating	  the	  pertinence	  of	  such	  method-­‐
ologies.	  Empirical	  regularities	  in	  the	  cases	  pathways	  were	  identified,	  opening	  interesting	  avenues	  for	  
more	  deductive	   research,	  and	  the	  diversity	  of	   innovative	  behaviours	  emphasized.	  Because	  actors	  –	  
even	  beneficiaries	  such	  as	  environmental	  NGOs	  –	  pursue	  their	  own	  interests	  in	  their	  innovation	  en-­‐
deavours,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  aim	  mainly	  at	  improving	  the	  ‘environment’,	  the	  somehow	  positive	  gap	  
we	  expected	  may	  in	  some	  cases	  be	  neutral,	  or	  even	  negative	  in	  terms	  of	  problem-­‐solving;	  innovation	  
is	  thus	  not,	  per	  se,	  a	  panacea.	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